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Abstract
Background: The near universal adoption of cross-border health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic
worldwide has prompted significant debate about their effectiveness and compliance with international law. The
number of measures used, and the range of measures applied, have far exceeded previous public health
emergencies of international concern. However, efforts to advance research, policy and practice to support their
effective use has been hindered by a lack of clear and consistent definition.
Results: Based on a review of existing datasets for cross-border health measures, such as the Oxford Coronavirus
Government Response Tracker and World Health Organization Public Health and Social Measures, along with
analysis of secondary and grey literature, we propose six categories to define measures more clearly and
consistently – policy goal, type of movement (travel and trade), adopted by public or private sector, level of
jurisdiction applied, stage of journey, and degree of restrictiveness. These categories are then brought together into
a proposed typology that can support research with generalizable findings and comparative analyses across
jurisdictions. Addressing the current gaps in evidence about travel measures, including how different jurisdictions
apply such measures with varying effects, in turn, enhances the potential for evidence-informed decision-making
based on fuller understanding of policy trade-offs and externalities. Finally, through the adoption of standardized
terminology and creation of an agreed evidentiary base recognized across jurisdictions, the typology can support
efforts to strengthen coordinated global responses to outbreaks and inform future efforts to revise the WHO
International Health Regulations (2005).
Conclusions: The widespread use of cross-border health measures during the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted
significant reflection on available evidence, previous practice and existing legal frameworks. The typology put forth
in this paper aims to provide a starting point for strengthening research, policy and practice.
Keywords: COVID-19, Cross-border health measures, Border management, Travel measures, Trade measures,
International Health Regulations, Typology
© The Author(s). 2021 Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License,
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if
changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons
licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain
permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the
data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.
* Correspondence: kelley_lee@sfu.ca
1Faculty of Health Sciences, Simon Fraser University, Blusson Hall, 8888
University Drive, Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Lee et al. Globalization and Health           (2021) 17:62 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12992-021-00709-0
Introduction
A cross-border health measure can be broadly defined as
action taken to control movement of people (travel) or
trade across two or more jurisdictions with the stated in-
tent of achieving a health goal. During the COVID-19
(coronavirus disease) pandemic, the number of countries
adopting and impacted by cross-border health measures
has been unprecedented. While up to 25% of countries
adopted such measures during previous disease out-
breaks, virtually all countries have done so during the
COVID-19 pandemic [1]. Moreover, countries have
adopted a wider range of measures than previously ob-
served and have implemented them in highly varied
ways. In turn, studies of cross-border health measures
apply diverse, and sometimes inconsistent, terminology
to describe these practices. This has reduced the com-
parability and generalizability of research findings. Media
reporting has likewise applied varied and sometimes
misleading terms such as ‘border closures’ and ‘travel
bans’ despite few jurisdictions actually closing their bor-
ders or banning travel. More precisely, a variety of mea-
sures have been applied and lifted over time for
controlling who travels and under specific conditions.
Importantly, this lack of clear and consistent definition
persists at a time of substantial debate about the legality
and effectiveness of cross-border health measures in re-
sponse to the COVID-19 pandemic [2–4].
This paper argues that more precise and agreed defin-
ition is a starting point for understanding why and how
cross-border health measures are used and to what ef-
fect. We begin by providing a brief background on the
use of these measures during COVID-19, the existing
lack of definitional clarity and/or consistency, and the
implications for research, policy and practice. To address
this gap, we propose six ways to categorize cross-border
health measures. We integrate these categories into a
proposed typology that can be used, not only to advance
research, but to guide decision makers when making
choices about the intended purpose, target and imple-
mentation of cross-border health measures. We con-
clude that clear and consistent definition, alongside an
agreed typology, is an important starting point for pro-
ducing generalizable findings, comparative analyses, and
evidence-informed responses across jurisdictions. This
includes future efforts to revise and improve compliance
with the World Health Organization (WHO) Inter-
national Health Regulations (IHR).
Background
As the legal framework “to prevent, protect against, con-
trol and provide a public health response to the inter-
national spread of disease”, the WHO IHR (2005)
commits States Parties to act in ways that are commen-
surate with public health risks and which avoid
“unnecessary interference with international traffic and
trade” [5]. Cross-border health measures, largely covered
under IHR Article 43 (Additional health measures),
should only be applied if they meet certain criteria. Such
measures are permitted if they are not, among other
things, “more restrictive of international traffic and not
more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably
available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate
level of health protection,” supported by scientific princi-
ples and evidence, and promptly reported to WHO [6].
In the context of COVID-19, however, these criteria
have proven somewhat malleable, in part, because of
limited, uncertain, and rapidly evolving scientific
evidence.
After declaring COVID-19 a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern (PHEIC) on 30 January 2020,
the IHR Emergency Committee initially recommended
against “any travel or trade restriction based on the
current information available” [7]. Some States Parties
had already adopted travel-related restrictions prior to
this declaration. Many more then immediately disre-
garded WHO’s recommendation, prompting inter-
national legal scholars to criticize States Parties for
alleged non-compliance with the IHR (2005 [2, 8, 9]. In-
dividuals and groups adversely affected by the restric-
tions, such as the tourism sector [10] and frontline
humanitarian and medical professionals responding to
the pandemic [11], called on governments to ease re-
strictions. As the pandemic worsened, others criticized
governments for not applying cross-border health mea-
sures earlier and/or more stringently [12, 13], or for eas-
ing them prematurely [14]. By March 2020, use of
travel-related measures became near universal. Imple-
mentation was highly uncoordinated and somewhat cha-
otic, with cross-border health measures being adopted in
highly varying forms, duration, and scope across the
world [15–17]. The result has been “a dangerous process
of trial and error” [18].
Terminology used by government, media and other
commentators to describe this near universal and varied
use of cross-border health measures has also lacked clar-
ity and/or consistency. Governments seeking to reassure
their domestic populations, that strong action is being
taken to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 importation,
have often used language suggestive of sealed borders
[19–21] or prohibited traffic from high-risk areas [22,
23]. Given their significant social and economic impacts,
cross-border health measures have attracted substantial
media attention, with terms such as “border closure”
[24, 25] and “travel ban” [26, 27] frequently used. In
practice, few if any countries sealed their borders or
banned travel during the COVID-19 pandemic. These
terms are misnomers of actual practice, namely, to re-
strict selected traffic and manage remaining cross-
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border movements. They have also obscured the varied
practices that countries have followed to achieve this.
Lack of clarity and/or inconsistency in terminology
has not helped the increasingly fraught debates about
the legality and effectiveness of cross-border health mea-
sures. Amid what Kenwick and Simmons describe as
growing “border anxiety” during the pandemic [28], the
IHR (2005) stipulates that “scientific principles” based
on evidence should guide policy decisions. While there
is international agreement that decisions about the use
of cross-border health measures need to be evidence-
informed, systematic reviews conclude that the eviden-
tiary base is limited at best. Most of what was previously
known about cross-border health measures is based on
studies of pandemic and seasonal influenza, severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV-1) and Ebola virus
[29]. SARS-CoV-2 combines several features that distin-
guish it from these previous outbreaks including being a
respiratory (versus vector borne) pathogen, having a high
reproductive rate (person-to-person transmissibility),
and causing many asymptomatic or low-level symptom-
atic cases [30]. As such, previously held beliefs about
cross-border health measures have been questioned in
relation to SARS-CoV-2. One systematic review, to as-
sess the effectiveness of “travel-related control measures”
during COVID-19 (25 studies), as well as, outbreaks of
SARS-CoV-1 and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) (11 studies), finds that such measures “may help
to limit the spread of disease across national borders”
[31]. However, “confidence in these results is limited”
given their derivation from assumptions used in model-
ling studies rather than “real life data”; substantial vari-
ation in what measures studies analysed; and the lack of
peer review. Our systematic review of domestic and
international “travel measures” implemented during the
early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic (29 studies)
finds that
the adoption of travel measures led to important
changes in the dynamics of the early phases of the
COVID-19 pandemic. However, most of the identi-
fied studies investigated the initial export of cases
out of Wuhan, which was found to be highly effect-
ive, but few studies investigated the effectiveness of
measures implemented in other contexts [32].
We conclude that “[t]here is an urgent need to address
important evidence gaps” including the specific cross-
border health measures applied, the forms of mobility
being controlled, and the context in which they are ap-
plied. Most analysis, for example, focus on travel while
there has been little study of health-related trade flows
during the pandemic. There are also few, if any, com-
parative analyses of how cross-border health measures
have been used in different settings, what factors have
influenced their effectiveness at achieving public health
goals, and what wider societal effects have resulted.
Efforts to improve the evidentiary base on cross-
border health measures have been hindered, in turn, by
the lack of clear and/or consistent definition. For ex-
ample, a decision framework by Zlojutro et al., to
optimize border controls for global outbreak mitigation,
limits the definition of a border control mechanism to
“passenger screening upon arrival at airports (entry
screening)” [33]. Habibi et al. exclude screening at ports
of entry and exit as “travel restrictions” but include “de
facto travel restrictions” notably when “airlines stop fly-
ing to places” [2]. Iacus et al. focus their analysis on “air
traffic suspension” in “analysing the impact of travel
bans on the aviation sector” [34]. Russell et al. define
travel restrictions as “any measure that completely or al-
most completely prevents international arrivals from
contributing to local transmission, such as entry bans
and compulsory 14-day facility-based quarantines” [35].
Finally, the term non-pharmaceutical interventions
(NPI) is widely used in public health research, with dif-
ferent researchers including [36] or excluding cross-
border measures [37].
Ultimately, clear and agreed terminology and defin-
ition is a critical starting point to advancing shared un-
derstandings, cumulative knowledge and ultimately
scientific principles on the effective and appropriate use
of cross-border health measures during a PHEIC. Out-
breaks that involve novel pathogens like SARS-CoV-2,
by virtue of being novel, pose challenges for evidence-
informed decision making because of knowledge gaps.
Nevertheless, it is possible to review and structure best
available evidence from previous outbreaks and known
pathogens in ways that can inform decision making
choices. This begins, once again, with agreed termin-
ology and definition.
Methodology
The Pandemics and Borders Project (https://www.
pandemics-borders.org/) is analysing the near universal
use of cross-border health measures by countries during
the COVID-19 pandemic. For this article, we begin with
the WHO Public Health and Social Measures (PHSM)
Dataset [38] which collates “data from the main trackers,
bringing them into a standard structure and coding
them to a common taxonomy.” The trackers currently
include the ACAPS government measures dataset [39],
Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Research Centre
dataset (a subset of the national and state level dataset)
[40], University of Oxford Coronavirus Government Re-
sponse Tracker [41], and US Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention COVID Data Tracker Weekly Review
[42]. We then compiled the terminology used in the
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common taxonomy and glossary of the WHO PHSM
dataset on “domestic travel” and “international travel
measures” [43]. In addition, we reviewed the terminology
used in 29 studies of cross-border health measures ap-
plied, during the early stages of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, identified in our systematic review [32]. Finally,
we reviewed detailed government websites on the adop-
tion and updating of cross-border health measures dur-
ing COVID-19 available on-line from January 2020 to
April 2021. These were identified with on-line searches
of Google using the keywords “travel”, “trade”, “border*”
combined with “ban*”, “restriction*”, “clos*”, “policy” and
“measure”. We focused specifically on Canada, Hong
Kong and the USA, for which we are conducting de-
tailed case studies on decision making concerning cross-
border measures, along with dozens of other countries
and subnational jurisdictions listed in the WHO dataset.
Using these sources, we compiled “text segments” or
phrases about these measures. We then applied a
grounded theory approach to these text segments. As
Udo Kelle explains, this approach contrasts with the
classical hypothetico-deductive approach “which re-
quires the construction of clear-cut categories and hy-
potheses before data is collected” [44]. Instead,
categories describing specific properties or characteris-
tics of groups of cross-border measures were allowed to
emerge from the text segments. While grounded theory
calls upon researchers to let categories emerge from data
and not to impose preconceived categories, we recognize
that our study of previous outbreaks from a largely inter-
national relations (politics and economics) disciplinary
lens shaped our engagement with the text segments. Po-
tential categories were identified by the lead author and
then discussed by all authors for degree to which it de-
scribed distinct features or characteristics of cross-
border health measures. To assess their heuristic useful-
ness, we checked for empirical evidence and examples of
each category by coding a sample of the WHO dataset
(entries for a random date). For categories where there
is insufficient empirical data to create a clear system of
categorization, or where a category could not be parsed
into clear subcategories, they were discarded. For ex-
ample, the potential category of “compliant” versus
“non-compliant” (or degree of compliance) with the IHR
(2005) was abandoned because of search for categories
on features characterizing the measures rather than their
relationship to international law. The latter is further
complicated by the limited scientific principles against
which to determine compliance. Ongoing legal debates
about the meaning and practice of IHR compliance, in
light of COVID-19, make it impossible to classify spe-
cific measures therefore as either compliant or non-
compliant. A second discarded category sought to separ-
ately characterise measures by the quality or extent to
which they were implemented. After considering the di-
verse ways in which measures have been adopted during
COVID-19, we decided instead to add the category re-
strictiveness characterized by a broad range of subcat-
egories. A total of six categories were confirmed through
coding of empirical data as having heuristic usefulness.
To develop the proposed typology, we carefully con-
sidered any relationships, required sequencing by time
or place, or prioritisation among these six categories.
This led to the identification of a hierarchically ordered
structure linking the categories together. This typology
does not preclude further categories and refinement
through further subcategory levels (e.g. types of travel
and trade). However, the aim of this initial exercise is to
identify major categories that will begin to more clearly
define, conceptualize and then advance research, policy
and practice on cross-border health measures.
An important caveat to note is that, given the existing
lack of clarity and consistency in terminology, the six
categories and typology are only intended to be a start-
ing point for increased standardization. This exercise has
not been necessary in the past given the more circum-
scribed use of cross-border health measures, in form and
duration, during previous PHEICs [45]. At the time of
writing, the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing and add-
itional measures may yet be applied that are not in-
cluded in this analysis. Future refinement of these
categories and typology may be needed accordingly.
Results: categorizing cross-border health
measures
There have been an unprecedented number and range
of cross-border health measures used at different juris-
dictional levels during the COVID-19 pandemic. Apply-
ing the methodology described above, we identify six
categories that offer clearer definition of distinct features
of these measures.
Measure by policy goal
Cross-border health measures have a stated aim of sup-
porting health policy goals such as the prevention and
control of disease spread across jurisdictions, reduction
of imported health risks, and promotion of access to
health-related goods and services. However, it is import-
ant to recognize that cross-border health measures can
be shaped by a mixture of health and non-health policy
goals. Multiple goals are usually at play simultaneously,
representing potential trade-offs among different parts
of government. For example, the Canadian government
announced the cancellation of direct flights to Mexico
and selected Caribbean holiday destinations on January
29, 2021 in response to the risk of importing variants of
concern. The decision not to ban all international flights,
despite the global circulation of variants, reflected a
Lee et al. Globalization and Health           (2021) 17:62 Page 4 of 19
desire to control the adverse economic impacts from re-
duced travel and trade [46]. Similarly, the easing of
travel restrictions by many European countries during
summer 2020, to stimulate the tourism sector, increased
the spread of SARS-CoV-2 across the region [47]. In
some cases, health and non-health goals may come dir-
ectly into conflict. For example, opposition by some
member states of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), to a temporary waiver of intellectual property
rights over patented COVID-19 vaccines, protects the
economic interests of the pharmaceutical industry. In
doing so, countries currently with limited access to vac-
cines are not permitted to manufacture generic versions
of vaccines for domestic populations and export to other
countries in need [48]. There may also be competing
health-related goals at play. A good example is the Euro-
pean Union’s use of export controls to secure vaccine
supplies for priority use by member states versus supply
to non-EU countries [49]. Finally, governments may
claim to apply a cross-border measure for health pur-
poses but be advancing another policy goal. For instance,
the indefinite extension of border restrictions by the
Trump Administration, on grounds of controlling
SARS-CoV-2, was described as an effort “to aggressively
use public health laws to reduce immigration” [50].
The co-existence of multiple, sometimes competing,
policy goals may help explain choices made about what
cross-border health measures have been used during the
COVID-19 pandemic, and how they have been applied.
In the US, the Trump Administration’s announced
“travel ban” on February 2, 2020, applying only to for-
eign (but not American) nationals who had travelled to
China during the previous 14 days, suggests policy
choices driven by political rather than public health risk
management [12]. When protecting public health is the
primary goal, measures may be applied universally and
stringently. For example, Australia has strictly limited
international arrivals to a quota of nationals, permanent
residents and essential travellers, in addition to adopting
mandatory testing and enforced quarantine policies with
minimal exemptions to prevent virus introduction under
a virus eradication (i.e., COVID zero) strategy. By con-
trast, the UK has adopted targeted restrictions for se-
lected travellers based on an agreed level of acceptable
risk of virus importation, a policy intended to balance
public health and economic policy goals through a virus
suppression strategy (i.e., level of transmission not ex-
ceeding healthcare system capacity). Similarly, restric-
tions on land border crossings between Canada and the
US have exempted travel and trade for economic pur-
poses as “essential”. Moreover, the adoption of a meas-
ure to achieve a specific public health goal (e.g., prevent
importation of infection) might interfere with another
public health goal (e.g., cross-border movement of health
care workers and carers) in the same jurisdiction. Or a
cross-border health measure adopted in one jurisdiction
(e.g., restricted export of personal protective equipment,
vaccines) can lead to public health harms in another jur-
isdiction. The potential adoption of so-called “vaccine
passports” or “immunity certificates” to enable the lifting
of cross-border health measures further illustrates that a
measure can lead to or amplify existing social inequities
within and across countries.
Moreover, it is also important to note the differential
impacts of cross-border health measures on diverse pop-
ulations. Measures adopted to protect the health of one
population group from COVID-19, such as domestic
populations, can have detrimental consequences for the
health and well-being of mobile populations such as mi-
grant workers, refugees and asylum seekers. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, the near universal adoption of
travel restrictions by governments has led to millions of
migrants being stranded worldwide. Many prevented
from returning home must live in conditions which put
their health at risk [51, 52]. This points to human rights
and ethical concerns regarding the potentially inequit-
able impacts of cross-border health measures on vulner-
able populations.
Overall, the use of cross-border health measures oc-
curs within a complex policy environment. Faced with
multiple and sometimes competing goals, decision
makers must weigh these against the normative frame-
works informing their choices. Scientific evidence should
be considered although this may be imperfect and in-
complete amid a public health emergency unfolding in
real time involving a novel pathogen. The impacts of
policy choices on public health and broader economic,
social and political goals may thus be unknown and even
unknowable.
Measure by type of movement
A broad range of cross-border measures are applied by
different regulatory authorities, to control different
forms of movement between one jurisdiction to another
for different purposes. These movements generally fall
into two broad subcategories: travel-related (i.e. human)
and trade-related (e.g. non-human animals, goods and
services, information, financial capital). When analysing
cross-border health measures, it is useful to distinguish
between these two subcategories. The IHR (2005) makes
this distinction, defining a “traveller” as limited to “a nat-
ural person [human] undertaking an international voy-
age.” The term “international traffic” encompasses both
travel and trade, defined as “the movement of persons,
baggage, cargo, containers, conveyances, goods or postal
parcels across an international border, including inter-
national trade” [53].
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The category of type of movement to be controlled
will depend on the nature of the risk. If the health risk is
a food borne hazard (i.e. biological, chemical or phys-
ical), for example, the measure adopted would target
relevant trade such as livestock (e.g., bovine spongiform
encephalopathy), fresh produce (e.g., salmonella, e-coli)
or manufactured product (e.g. lead poisoning) [54, 55]. If
the health risk is a communicable pathogen transmitted
by direct contact, droplet or airborne, cross-border
health measures would target travellers. For vector-
borne diseases, travel or trade-related movements may
need to be targeted (e.g., spraying, disinfection). These
subcategories of travel and trade also help to identify
forms of movement that are not currently, but may need
to be, controlled. The flow of health-related mis/disin-
formation via social media across jurisdictions, for
example, has come under growing scrutiny given poten-
tially adverse impacts on adherence to public health pro-
tocols during the COVID-19 response [56].
Within each of the two subcategories of travel and
trade, a further sub-classification can be made between,
first, measures that determine whether and how much
movement (travel or trade) is permitted, and second,
what conditions movement is permitted to occur. The
first concerns measures that encompass government pol-
icy regarding travel to or from specific jurisdictions
which can be an advisory or alert (recommendation) or
mandatory restriction. For travel, the latter may take the
form of a ban on movement for a selected jurisdiction or
population. For trade, the latter may take the form of an
embargo on trade with a selected company or country.
Measures that determine movement also include actions
that impact the logistics of travel or trade notably
whether a point of entry is open or closed, or the avail-
ability of transport for travel or trade (e.g., cancellation
of flights, cruises). The securing of special documenta-
tion (e.g., visa) and payment of fees (entry/exit fee, im-
port/export tariff) are further measures that determine
movement. Finally, movement can be impacted by limits
by volume (e.g., ceilings, quotas) or purpose of move-
ment (e.g., essential versus non-essential). For example,
during COVID-19, most countries have permitted the
continued movement of what is deemed essential travel
(e.g., key workers, armed forces, diplomacy, humanitar-
ian reasons) and essential trade (e.g., medical supplies,
food). The import and export of essential supplies such
as personal protective equipment, ventilators and vac-
cines were also the subject to control measures by up to
80 countries [57, 58].
Second, there are measures that determine the condi-
tions under which travel and trade movements are per-
mitted to occur. These measures manage health risks
associated with traffic moving across different jurisdic-
tions by identifying the presence of the risk (i.e.
screening/inspection, testing, vector surveillance), con-
trolling the onward spread of risk (i.e. contact tracing,
quarantine/isolation, vector control, certification), and
improving public awareness of risk (i.e. information
provision). This distinction provides a potentially first
step in determining whether a measure is appropriate or
proportionate to the nature of the health risk to be ad-
dressed. As stated by the IHR (2005), “measures shall
not be more restrictive of international traffic and not
more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably
available alternatives that would achieve the appropriate
level of health protection” [6]. For some risks, therefore,
such as yellow fever, measures to determine whether
movement should occur are unnecessary as vaccination
certification is sufficient. During the COVID-19 pan-
demic, however, multiple measures have been needed
simultaneously given the nature of the pathogen and
mode of transmission. A summary of travel and trade
measures, by whether movement permitted and what
conditions movement occurs, is summarized in Table 1.
Measure adopted by public or private sector
Cross-border health measures are, for the most part, of-
ficially adopted and applied by public sector authorities
operating across different parts (e.g., health, transport,
customs and excise, immigration, law enforcement) and
levels (international, national, subnational) of govern-
ment. During the COVID-19 pandemic, as of April
2021, the WHO PHSM dataset suggests most cross-
border health measures adopted have been applied by
governments. The IHR (2005) sets out commitments by
States Parties to use cross-border health measures only
under certain conditions as part of overall actions to
prevent the international spread of disease. The IHR is
then underpinned by a range of national-level govern-
ance arrangements, set out in national and subnational
public health legislation, which set out the ways that
government can and should act.
However, clearer definition of cross-border health
measures should include actions taken by private sector
entities that influence travel and trade movements
(Table 2) but yet are beyond the scope of the IHR
(2005). This was apparent during the early stages of the
COVID-19 pandemic when many airlines and cruise
ship companies acted quickly and even earlier than
many governments in restricting travel. For instance,
KLM Airlines suspended all flight operations to and
from Shanghai and Beijing from 29 January 2020, while
the Dutch government introduced border restrictions on
18 March 2020. In early February 2020, the US cruise
ship company Royal Caribbean restricted passengers
holding Chinese passports regardless of travel history
[60]. Many companies reduced, rerouted, or suspended
selected services. While initial cross-border measures by
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private companies appear to have been motivated by ef-
forts to reduce health risks to passengers, many were
subsequently based on business decisions as demand de-
clined and it became insufficiently profitable to continue
some services. Other measures are motivated by efforts
to reduce the health risks of travelling during a pan-
demic, as a means of encouraging consumer uptake and
resuming business. Thus, the private sector has been at
the forefront of developing pre-departure and on-board
protocols including hygiene practices, wearing of face
coverings, and testing. The private sector has also con-
ducted or sponsored research to assess risks associated
with travel [61]. Some airlines have created incentives to
travellers such as price reductions and free travel insur-
ance. For the most part, these actions are governed by
individual company policies and lay outside the authority
of the IHR (2005). Table 2 provides examples of cross-
border health measures used by the private sector during
COVID-19.
Alongside recognition of measures taken by both the
public and private sector, analysis of the effective use of
cross-border health measures should take account of the
interconnectedness of these actions. For example, the
US government’s restrictions on travel to and from Wu-
han, China is believed prompted by airline flight
cancellation [12]. Conversely, the adoption of pre-border
testing requirements by many governments led some air-
lines and airports to provide convenient and even
complimentary testing facilities for travellers. Private
contractors have been hired to implement certain mea-
sures mandated by government (e.g., testing, quarantine
enforcement). Carriers have been punished by some gov-
ernments for failing to comply with such measures. In
Hong Kong, for example, if an airline violates travel re-
strictions (e.g., allowing someone to board without the
appropriate negative test certificate), or if too many trav-
ellers subsequently test positive, the airline is banned
from inbound travel for 14 days. As a result, KLM, Emir-
ates, and British Airways were all banned at one point,
and Air India and Nepal airlines were repeat offenders
[62]. Where governments have failed to act swiftly
enough, such as providing testing and vaccination of em-
ployees in the US, the private sector has stepped into the
breach [63].
Alternatively, a disconnect between public and private
measures has been evident in some countries, whereby a
government strongly advises against but does not pro-
hibit non-essential travel, while businesses such as air-
lines and hotels continue to advertise holidays, thus
confusing the public about official restrictions. Travel by
numerous public officials as private citizens for holidays
and other non-essential reasons despite these advisories
Table 1 Cross-border health measures to control travel- and trade-related movements
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC
TRAVEL-RELATED MEASURES TRADE-RELATED MEASURES
WHETHER MOVEMENT PERMITTE
D
travel advisory or alert (recommendation) or restriction
(requirement)
trade advisory or alert (recommendation) or restriction
(requirement)
point of entry by land, air or sea open/closed point of entry by land, air or sea open/closed
transport availability transport availability
entry or exit restriction import/export restriction
visa requirement licensing requirement
essential travel documentation essential goods or services documentation








disease free or vaccination certification disease free or vaccination certification
information provision information provision
vector surveillance and control [59] vector surveillance and control
Table 2 Cross-border health measures applied by private sector
MEASURE EXAMPLES
restricted access to mode of
transport
flight cancellations, cruise ship
cancellations
health screening passenger screening
testing testing contractor
certification vaccine passport scheme
financial incentives/disincentives reduced pricing, free health insurance
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have further added to public confusion and distrust [64].
In Canada, the federal government and airlines sought
to better align messaging and practice with an agree-
ment announced in January 2021 to cancel direct flights
to and from selected holiday destinations in Mexico and
the Caribbean [65]. However, indirect flights continued
to operate for these destinations by other airlines. Over-
all, defining cross-border health measures requires an
understanding of the roles of both the public and private
sector, and how the relationships between them influ-
ences cross-border governance.
Measure by level of jurisdiction applied
Analyses of cross-border health measures prior to
COVID-19 focused on travel and trade between two or
more countries (i.e., international borders) [31]. How-
ever, insufficient account has been taken of their use at
different levels of jurisdiction. Studies of travel-related
restrictions, in particular, focus on national-level mea-
sures or have conflated different levels [32]. As a result,
it is difficult to separate out the effectiveness of mea-
sures applied at a particular level when measures are
simultaneously applied at more than one level. Lack of
distinction by jurisdiction also undermines the accuracy
of comparative analyses.
As the world has become more interconnected from
the late twentieth century, traffic volumes have signifi-
cantly increased. Thus, health measures sit alongside
varied national regulation of travel and trade between
sovereign states. International agreements set out how
States Parties apply these measures in a standardized
and coordinated way. For example, the WTO adminis-
ters international treaties setting out agreed conditions
to facilitate the movement of trade and investment. The
IHR (2005) sets out commitments by States Parties to
coordinate use of cross-border health measures to pre-
vent and control the international spread of disease. The
Codex Alimentarius is a collection of standards, guide-
lines and codes of practice established by the Food and
Agriculture Organization and WHO to protect con-
sumer health and promote fair practices in food trade
[66].
However, clear definition of cross-border health mea-
sures should also take account of their use at other levels
of jurisdiction both above and below the state (Table 3).
There are bilateral and regional arrangements, encom-
passing selected countries, relevant to health-related
cross-border movements (e.g., European Union, Schen-
gen Area). During non-pandemic times, regional agree-
ments regulate the cross-border movement of patients
[70], health care workers [71], and financing. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, bilateral agreements have been
reached to govern travel across land borders between
countries (e.g., US-Canada, US-Mexico) [72]. Regional
arrangements to establish “air bridges” and “travel corri-
dors” have proliferated [73]. While most involve two or
more sovereign states, some combine a subnational area
with sovereign states (e.g. Trans-Tasman Travel Bubble).
Amid concerns about limited vaccine supplies, Germany
called on potential restriction of exports from the Euro-
pean Union [74].
During COVID-19, domestic travel restrictions are in-
creasingly recognized as an important means of control-
ling spread of the coronavirus [75]. Cross-border health
measures have been extensively used to control move-
ments across internal or domestic (subnational jurisdic-
tions) borders. In the UK, travel advisories sought to
limit non-essential travel between the four nations (Eng-
land, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). Tiering of
areas in England (defined by a mix of cities, counties
and subregions), based on “five epidemiological indica-
tors” (e.g., coronavirus infection case detection rates,
positivity rate), sought to limit travel between higher and
lower risk areas between November 2020 and January




Quarantine measures for travellers under the IHR (WHO) Codex Alimentarius Commission Standards
(WHO/FAO)
REGIONAL/BILATERAL European Council Recommendation on coordinated approach to
restriction of free movement [67]
US-Mexico agreement to limit non-essential travel
UK travel corridors to 50 countries
Tasman Bubble (Australia/New Zealand)





state-level travel restrictions (Australia)
US federal control of PPE supplies to
individual US states
MUNICIPAL Wuhan lockdown
Big White Ski Resort, BC limits bookings to residents (Canada) [68]
Gombe commune, Kinshasa lockdown (DRC) [69]
MARKET Airline requirements for passengers on selected routes (e.g., testing)
Cancellation of cruises in selected regions
Purchase agreements for COVID-19
vaccines
Lee et al. Globalization and Health           (2021) 17:62 Page 8 of 19
2021 [76]. Travel restrictions have been used extensively
by Australian states and territories to control domestic
spread of the coronavirus [77]. In Canada, the so-called
“Atlantic bubble” formed from June–November 2020
allowed unrestricted travel by residents among four Can-
adian provinces, and restricted travel by non-residents
from other provinces [78, 79]. In the US, travel restric-
tions have localized by state, municipality and even
neighbourhoods (e.g., New York City) [80]. There have
been fewer efforts to control subnational trade. One ex-
ample is the US where, amid surging cases of COVID-
19, it was reported that the Trump Administration
blocked PPE supplies to several states including Mich-
igan and Massachusetts [81]. Shortages in essential sup-
plies (e.g., PPE, ventilators) in the US during the early
stages of the pandemic led to reports of diversion of
placed orders of selected states by the federal govern-
ment [82].
Finally, when analysing cross-border health measures,
further complexity can arise when arrangements com-
bine multiple jurisdictional levels. For example, during
the early stages of the pandemic, different countries
adopted a mixture of restrictions on travellers from the
city of Wuhan, Hubei Province and China as a whole.
Alternatively, travel restrictions may exempt daily com-
muters between a country and a subregion of a neigh-
bouring country (e.g., Switzerland and bordering regions
in France; day workers crossing the bridge from Johor,
Malaysia into Singapore). Travel restrictions seeking to
control the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and variants of con-
cern have simultaneously targeted selected cities, coun-
tries, and regions [41]. For example, Japan used a
targeted subnational approach vis-a-vis parts of northern
Italy in March 2020 [83] which mirrored earlier restric-
tions for travellers from parts of China, Iran, and South
Korea [84]. Concerns about the spread of the P1 variant
led the UK government to ban flights from South Amer-
ica and Portugal [85]. Jurisdictions with special or dis-
puted legal status also require specific arrangements.
Movements between Hong Kong and mainland China,
for example, are treated as somewhere between inter-
national and domestic given the former’s status as a spe-
cial administrative region, with its own immigration
policies, while still part of the country. A similar situ-
ation exists regarding stricter travel restrictions adopted
by New Caledonia, a French Overseas Territory, and the
rest of France, which only permits French citizens arriv-
ing on a select route (via Japan) and then only after
undergoing quarantine. There are also now thousands of
special economic zones worldwide to facilitate trade and
investment, located within a country’s national borders,
but governed separately. Most complex, perhaps, are
measures taken by private sector actors according to
market-based jurisdictions combining mode of transport
(e.g., cruise itinerary) and geographical location (e.g.,
Asia). For jurisdictions such as these, measures adopted
during COVID-19 may reflect the specific political, eco-
nomic or legal status of these jurisdictions.
Measure by stage of journey
Cross-border health measures can be categorized by the
point of application along three main stages of a journey
– pre-border, at-the-border and within-the-border. The
stage at which a measure is applied can depend on con-
siderations such as administrative convenience, cost, lo-
gistics and nature of health risk. In general, measures
determining whether movement is permitted are applied
at the pre-border stage to minimise denial of entry at a
border. Thus, travel and trade are impacted by recom-
mendations or requirements to avoid certain jurisdic-
tions, the opening or closure of points of entry, and
availability of transport. Where specific procedures must
be followed or documentation needs to be obtained,
which can be time-consuming and costly, it is also more
appropriate to administer these at the pre-border stage.
This includes assembling evidence of eligibility to travel
or trade, screening/inspection, health certifications, test-
ing and pre-travel quarantine. In December 2020, for
example, the Chinese government introduced the re-
quirement that foreign nationals undergo nucleic acid
and IgM anti-body tests and complete a Health Declar-
ation Certificate two days before boarding [86]. For the
safe importation of live animals into the European
Union, to avoid the transmission of diseases, health cer-
tificates must be obtained beforehand, signed by an offi-
cial veterinarian of the competent authority of the
exporting non-EU country guaranteeing that the condi-
tions for import into the EU have been met [87].
At-the-border measures are applied when a traveller
or trade physically reaches a point of entry. These in-
clude checking necessary documentation (e.g. visa, proof
of essential travel, vaccination or negative test certifi-
cates), further testing or vaccination (e.g. yellow fever),
screening/inspection and quarantine/isolation; and pay-
ment of additional fees, fines or penalties. Vector control
through disinfection and disinsection procedures may be
applied. Quarantine of non-humans (i.e. pets, wildlife,
livestock) is applied at a border by customs officials who
check documentation, inspect the animals, and keep
them in quarantine for a requisite period depending on
the type of animal until their release from customs [88].
Finally, some measures are applied within-the-border
to extend the management of health risks after entry
into a jurisdiction. Quarantine of humans may be ap-
plied at-the-border but, strictly speaking, is administered
after a traveller enters a jurisdiction. During the Ebola
virus outbreak in 2014, for example, returning travellers
to the US were quarantined at some airports, although
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this technically occurred on American soil [89]. During
the COVID-19 pandemic, mandatory quarantine of
international and some domestic arrivals after entry has
been carried out at designated sites or places of resident.
Further screening/inspection and testing of travellers
and trade after entry may occur. In England (but not the
rest of the UK), international travellers must test prior
to departure (within 72 h), and days two and eight after
arrival [90]. Other countries require further testing at
varying number of days after arrival. A summary of
travel and trade measures by stage of journey is provided
in Table 4.
The categorising of cross-border health measures
using a full journey perspective encourages a more com-
prehensive and integrated approach to managing health
risks associated with cross-border mobility. In some
cases, measures may be required at multiple stages of a
journey (e.g. screening, testing and quarantine). Testing
at multiple points to reduce any residual risk, for in-
stance, is needed because of ongoing risks of exposure,
the course of infection (i.e. insufficient viral load for de-
tection, incubation period) and false negative results.
This approach is illustrated by Australian travel policy
during the COVID-19 pandemic which covers measures
from pre-travel to the end of the journey. Travellers to
Australia must first be deemed eligible, specify whether
they will arrive via a red or green zone (i.e. level of risk),
self-screen for symptoms, take a PCR test and test nega-
tive within 72 h of departure, and pre-book an available
slot (within the quota limit) at a designated quarantine
hotel (if required) prior to departure. Upon arrival, the
traveller must provide proof of a negative test result, be
screened, tested and, if from a red zone, sent to a gov-
ernment designated quarantine facility for a minimum of
14 days. During quarantine, further tests will be adminis-
tered at 10–12 days. If negative, the traveller will be




travel advisory or alert (recommendation) or restriction
(requirement)
point of entry by land, air or sea open/closed
transport availability
entry or exit restriction entry or exit restriction
ceilings and quotas
visa requirement visa requirement
essential travel documentation essential travel documentation
disease free or vaccination certification disease free or vaccination
certification





entry/exit fees and surcharges entry/exit fees and surcharges
fines and penalties fines and penalties
contact tracing
TRADE trade advisory or alert (recommendation) or restriction
(requirement)
customs inspection health inspection
point of entry by land, air or sea open/closed
transport availability




technical requirements (e.g. labelling) fines and penalties fines and penalties
levy and payment of tariffs levy and payment of tariffs levy and payment of tariffs
vector surveillance and control vector surveillance and control vector surveillance and control
quota (maximum volume of travel or trade)
inspection inspection inspection
testing
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permitted to enter Australia but must abide by all public
health rules including any inter-state travel restrictions.
If tested positive at any time, they must remain in isola-
tion [91].
This full journey approach also supports efforts to
manage the costly and challenging logistics of imple-
menting cross-border health measures for high volumes
of travel and trade. Given finite resources, decision
makers may consider how measures applied at one stage,
such as vaccination and testing, can potentially reduce
the need for the same measures at another stage. For in-
stance, if a traveller provides proof of a yellow fever vac-
cine received at the pre-border stage, there is no need
for vaccination, testing or quarantine at the point of
entry. The increased use of pre-border measures can re-
duce the administrative burden at the point of entry,
and reduce the need to implement substantial capacity
at-the-border and potential bottlenecks that hinder
cross-border flows. These benefits, however, need to be
weighed against potential increased risks of reduced
measures such as lower detection of travellers that be-
come infectious at a later stage of their journey. During
COVID-19, many governments require travellers to use
on-line apps to register required documentation and
pre-book reservations in quarantine facilities. If a gov-
ernment is seeking to discourage non-essential travel,
pre-border measures can act as a disincentive by shifting
the administrative and financial burden onto these trav-
ellers. Finally, effective use of pre-border measures can
play a valuable preventative role, by screening out or re-
ducing imported health risk. For example, regular in-
spections at the point of manufacture or processing can
enhance the safety before imported products or produce
arrive at their destination. Any assessment of the effect-
iveness of cross-border health measures applied during
COVID-19 needs to take account of how they have been
used for each of these three stages of a journey.
Measure by degree of restrictiveness
While the terms “travel ban” and “border closure” have
come to be commonly used during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, in practice, cross-border health measures vary
widely in degree of restrictiveness. The least restrictive
are advisories or warnings by a government seeking to
raise awareness of a potential health risk from travel or
trade. Certain precautions may also be recommended to
manage the risk. For travel, this might be delaying or
avoiding travel, vaccination or bringing essential sup-
plies. For trade, this might involve not purchasing or
consuming a product (e.g. contaminated food product),
issuing a recall or disposal. The most restrictiveness
measures are prohibitions on certain travel or trade.
The two most common subcategories of traveller sta-
tus used are citizenship or residency, and purpose of
travel (e.g. essential versus non-essential). Travel restric-
tions may also be targeted at travellers from selected
source countries deemed to be a particular risk to
health. Importantly, governments may also adopt mea-
sures that exempt or ease travel restrictions based on
certain categories of traveller [92] or source country.
Travel on humanitarian grounds (e.g., refugee, direct
family member) or economic benefit (e.g., students, es-
sential worker), or travel from selected jurisdictions
deemed safe from health risks, may be given exemptions
and even “fast tracked”. Trade-related restrictions can
also range from advisories, such as consumer alerts on
potentially harmful products, to bans on certain categor-
ies of goods or from a target source country. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, many countries eased certain
trade policies to facilitate the importation of necessary
health supplies and equipment, while others tightened
export controls to keep needed health and medical sup-
plies and equipment for national use.
Given the above, efforts have been made to categorize
selected cross-border health measures by their degree of
restriction during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Oxford
Coronavirus Government Response Tracker, for ex-
ample, collects data on 19 indicators, and records their
stringency at given points in time [41]. For international
travel controls, stringency ranges from no measures to
total border closure (Fig. 1). For internal (domestic)
movements, stringency of measures are categorized as
no measures, recommended movement restriction and
restrict movement (Fig. 2). However, only a limited
number of the travel-related measures listed in Tables 1
and 2 are included in this analysis. Similarly, the Inter-
national Air Transport Association (IATA) COVID-19
Travel Regulations Map categorizes countries as Totally
Restrictive, Partially Restrictive or Not Restrictive, with
no information provided on what measures are assessed
or how [93].
Building on these efforts, we argue that any compara-
tive assessment of the use of cross-border health mea-
sures needs clear criteria to assess restrictiveness or
stringency by type of movement and measure over time
and place. On type of movement, the extent to which a
measure impedes the movement of the targeted travel or
trade is the overall criteria. In addition, specific measures
vary in their restrictiveness, as well as, how specific mea-
sures are implemented can vary in restrictiveness
(Table 5). For example, screening (e.g. health declar-
ation, temperature check) would be considered less re-
strictive to travel than quarantine. In addition, specific
ways of implementing quarantine (i.e. duration, location,
voluntary versus mandatory, liability for cost) influences
stringency. Restrictiveness is also cumulative, with the
use of multiple cross-border health measures simultan-
eously capable of creating greater stringency. In all cases,
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degree of exemptions from the measure directly impacts
on restrictiveness. In Canada, there are many exemptions
from restrictions on international arrivals by non-nationals
and non-permanent residents including essential workers,
direct family members, holders of study visas, military
personnel, US citizens travelling to Alaska, and additional
individuals exempted by the government [106]. Many of
these categories are also exempt from the 14-day quaran-
tine requirements. In Hong Kong, there are few exemptions
to entry and quarantine permitted such as business execu-
tives of companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change travelling to and from the Chinese mainland [107].
Importantly, degree of restrictiveness should not be con-
flated with effectiveness in achieving a stated health goal.
Indeed, increased restrictiveness is not the same as greater
effectiveness. The appropriate degree of stringency will de-
pend on the health risk posed, including the nature of the
pathogen, and specific context for implementation of the
cross-border health measure. For screening, in particular,
a systematic review of evidence on COVID-19 studies to
May 2020 found “[o]ne-time screening in apparently
healthy people is likely to miss people who are infected”
[108]. For example, temperature screening may be
stringently enforced for all travellers, but evidence sug-
gests it offers limited public health benefit during previous
pandemics [109]. Analyses of the relationship between de-
gree of restrictiveness and effectiveness will need to ac-
count of a complex range of factors such as policy change
over time, evaluations of policy implementation, outbreak
dynamics and health outcomes.
Discussion: a proposed typology of cross-border
health measures
As far as we are aware, this is the most comprehensive
effort to develop categories for defining distinct features
of cross-border health measures. Bringing together the
six categories, Fig. 3 provides a typology of cross-border
health measures by type of movement, policy goal, level
of jurisdiction, stage of journey, public versus private
sector use, and degree of restrictiveness. The typology
sets out the many choices to be made when considering
border management. This begins with identifying the
policy goal(s) to be achieved, recognising that health and
non-health policy goals co-exist and influence the choice
of measures, how they are implemented, and whether
they are ultimately effective. This acknowledges that
Fig. 1 International travel controls during the COVID-19 pandemic, Dec 10, 2020. Source: https://ourworldindata.org/policy-responses-covid
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there will generally be trade-offs, limitations, and com-
promises to navigate whenever cross-border health mea-
sures are considered.
This typology is useful in several respects. First,
current research is characterized by varying and conflict-
ing terminology and often imprecise definition, thus re-
ducing the generalizability of findings and comparative
analyses across jurisdictions. Efforts to determine the ef-
fectiveness of cross-border health measures, in control-
ling the spread of disease, are challenged by differences
in practice and ways of describing them. This typology
offers a framework for identifying the specific measures
used in a standardized way. It encourages researchers to
describe measures with greater specificity and in ways
that enable comparability across the six categories. The
need for comparative analyses is especially important
given growing evidence that “[i]nternational travel was
directly associated with the mortality slope and thus po-
tentially the spread of COVID-19. Very early restrictions
on international travel should be considered to control
COVID-19 outbreaks and prevent related deaths.” [67]
Second, and relatedly, by supporting clear and consist-
ent definition of cross-border health measures, the
typology can facilitate research into the varying effects
and externalities of such measures. Rather than assum-
ing the possible benefits and harms of cross-border
health measures, our approach encourages explicit ana-
lysis of not only public health effects, but also social,
economic, ethical, and political externalities. For ex-
ample, the social and economic toll of cross-border
health measures may disproportionately harm vulnerable
groups, countries, and communities, provide a conveni-
ent excuse for governments to take discriminatory trade
and immigration measures, or create a false sense of se-
curity that may detract from other response measures
[110–113]. These externalities require explicit investiga-
tion that is not possible without clear and consistent def-
initions of cross-border health measures. Public health
benefits may still predominate, but these should not be
seen in isolation. Enhanced understanding of external-
ities can inform harm reduction policies and more ac-
curate assessments of the political implications of a
range of cross-border health measures for governments.
Third, the typology aims to support decision-making
on the use of cross-border health measures. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, policy debates have often focused
Fig. 2 Restrictions on internal movement during the COVID-19 pandemic, Dec 10, 2020. Source: https://ourworldindata.org/policy-responses-covid
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Table 5 Examples of restrictiveness of selected cross-border health measures during COVID-19 pandemic
MEASURE FACTORS AFFECTING RESTRICTIVENESS EXAMPLES
screening target population, stage(s) of journey, screening method,
frequency, intended data use, exemptions
Low
Germany: Carriers arriving from China, South Korea, Japan, Italy and
Iran required to report health status of passengers before entering
Germany. Information on Disease prevention distributed to
passengers (28 February 2020) [94]
Medium
Taiwan: All arrivals required to complete health declaration and
provide travel and contact history if visited China, Hong Kong or
Macao within 14 days before entry (12 February 2020) [95]
High
Benin: All arrivals coming from countries affected by COVID-19 (in-
cluding countries with only a single case of COVID-19) must identify
themselves using hotline. Such persons must self-isolate for 14 days
and may be subject to additional screening and/or relocation to a
quarantine facility (10 March 2020) [96].
testing target population, stage(s) of journey, timing, frequency, type
of test, liability for cost, exemptions
Low
United Kingdom: No testing requirements for international arrivals
until introduced on 18 January 2021 [97].
Medium
Norway: International arrivals must present proof of negative test for
coronavirus taken less than 24 h prior to entry. Five categories of
population are exempted (30 January 2021) [98]
High
Germany: Two-test strategy which provides for mandatory testing in
connection with entry and, voluntary testing for early termination of
quarantine at the earliest from the fifth day after entry. People who
enter Germany after staying in “high incidence areas” and “virus vari-
ant areas” in the last 10 days before entry is obliged to bring proof
that they are not infected with the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus upon ar-
rival. The test must be carried out at least 48 h before entry. If the
persons could not obtain evidence, carriers can carry out or have a
test carried out before departure. The smear for this test by the car-
rier may be made no more than 12 h before departure (2 February
2021) [99]
quarantine target populations, stage(s) of journey, length, location,
voluntary versus mandatory, liability for cost, method of
enforcement, exemptions
Low
USA: CDC recommends international arrivals self-quarantine for 7
days after travel (18 February 2020) [100]
Medium
Canada: International arrivals by air required to undertake up to 3-
day mandatory quarantine in designated hotels at traveller expense.
If PCR test upon arrival negative, remaining quarantine completed
at home with limited monitoring. International arrivals by land and
sea required to undertake 14-day quarantine with limited monitor-
ing (22 February 2021) [51]
High
Australia: Mandatory enforced 14-day quarantine introduced for all
international arrivals (citizens primarily) who must pre-book one of
limited slots in designated facility. Travellers pay cost of quarantine.
Limited categories of exemption permitted to quarantine at home




target populations, categories of eligibility, cost of entry visa Low
USA: Foreign nationals who travelled to China within past 14 days
banned from entry (2 February 2020) [102]
Medium
Estonia: Foreign workers in agricultural sector allowed to extend
short-term work permit. Workers from other sectors excluded (21
April 2020) [103]
High
Philippines: Non nationals denied entry with exception of crew
members, government and international organization officials, and
“uniformed personnel for official business” (20 March 2020) [104]
Australia: International arrivals limited to Australian nationals and
foreign nationals travelling for essential reasons. Cap of 1475 arrivals
per day introduced (4 July 2020) [105]
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on whether or travel restrictions work to prevent cor-
onavirus spread. Instead, this typology supports under-
standing of the complexity of choices faced when
thinking about the purpose of such measures, the broad
range of measures available, the ways that might be ap-
plied singly or in combination, and the importance of
timing and context. This shifts decisions, from a binary
question of whether or not to use cross-border health
measures, to what type of movement may need to be
controlled and what conditions need to be introduced to
manage an identified health risk. This typology also lo-
cates cross-border health measures within the broader
context of border management for different, and some-
times competing, policy goals. It is this complexity
which explains what Petersen and colleagues call a “dis-
sonance between scientific advice and political realities”
[114]. Public communication, when implementing such
measures, may also be clarified in ways that enhance
compliance.
Fourth, by aiming to strengthen research and policy, the
typology may encourage more coordinated use of cross-
border measures across jurisdictions. Evidence from previ-
ous PHEICs shows that effective global responses are facil-
itated by coordinated action across countries. However,
“there is no recognized coordinating body to disseminate
timely, consistent, reliable and authoritative information
and best practices to all stakeholders” [115]. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, there has been limited
coordination, with countries using their own mixture of
measures applied in different ways. The costs of uncoor-
dinated action are likely to include increased disease trans-
mission risks, prolonged outbreaks and unnecessary
economic and social impacts [116, 117].
Finally, the typology can inform future efforts to revise
the IHR (2005). The IHR (2005) is the legal framework
for the use of “additional health measures” by States Par-
ties based on “scientific principles.” The typology would
support more precise definition of additional health
measures, research to identify best practices, and thus
the development of scientific principles to guide action.
Moreover, the typology may inform future efforts to re-
vise the IHR (2005) by revealing cross-border health
measures not currently covered under their remit. Many
forms of trade are not currently subject to the regulatory
authority of IHR despite having implications for the
international spread of disease. For example, export con-
trols of PPE and vaccines during the COVID-19 pan-
demic fall beyond the authority of the IHR (2005).
The typology also supports an alternative approach to
assessing compliance with the IHR, beyond solely legal
interpretations of substantive adherence to Article 43
provisions, such as “shall not be more restrictive of
international traffic and not more invasive or intrusive
to persons than reasonably available alternatives that
would achieve the appropriate level of health protection,
” and “shall base their determinations upon…scientific
Fig. 3 Proposed typology of cross-border health measures
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principles [and] available scientific evidence” [6]. Clearer
definition of what constitutes “additional health mea-
sures”, empirical analyses of their public health and
broader impacts, and fuller understanding of the com-
plexity of empirically and normatively-based choices in-
volved when applying and lifting such measures,
suggests scientific principles for all types of outbreak
events (notably for emerging pathogens) and social set-
tings over time may remain elusive. Instead, compliance
could be additional assessed by the application of a deci-
sion instrument, informed by best practice and the
transparent consideration of agreed normative values,
applied over time during an unfolding event. Govern-
ments might thus demonstrate compliance through pro-
cedural due process, applying such a decision
instrument, to guide real-time choices. Use or non-use
of cross-border health measures could thus be deemed
compliant with the IHR through some combination of
the letter and spirit of the law [118]. The capacity to as-
sess both will still require significant improvements in
the evidentiary base regarding the effective use of such
measures. A critical starting point for this important re-
search, which this paper seeks to advance, is clear and
consistent definition and conceptualization of cross-
border health measures.
Conclusion
The widespread use of cross-border health measures dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic has prompted significant re-
flection on available evidence, previous practice and
existing legal frameworks. All are found wanting, particu-
larly given insufficiently clear and/or consistent definition
about the subject at hand. The typology put forth in this
paper aims to provide a starting point for strengthening
research, policy and practice. By encouraging a fuller un-
derstanding of border management using six categories of
measures, the use of cross-border health measures during
future PHEICs can be more evidence-informed, capable of
navigating policy complexity including managing trade-
offs and externalities, and ultimately appropriate and ef-
fective in protecting and promoting population health.
We argue that these are critical foundations to a more co-
ordinated approach to the use of cross-border health mea-
sures across jurisdictions.
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